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## OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

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1. KHRUSHCHEV IS HOST AT MOSCOW MEETING OF  
YUGOSLAV, BULGARIAN, AND ALBANIAN LEADERS

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A meeting of Soviet, Yugoslav, Bulgarian and Albanian leaders was held in Moscow on 18 July. The meeting, repeatedly described as "comradely" in Moscow's announcement, appears to have been intended by Khrushchev

to repair the damage he inflicted on Soviet-Yugoslav relations in his extemporaneous attacks on Tito in Prague last week. The participation of the Albanian and Bulgarian party leaders, long among Tito's most bitter enemies, apparently was to emphasize the sincerity of the USSR's friendly intentions toward Yugoslavia. The announcement strives to foster Western suspicion of Yugoslavia's intentions by giving a picture of an informal get-together among friends "in a warm and cordial atmosphere."

Because of the brevity of the meeting and the absence of Tito, it is unlikely that there was any resolution of the basic ideological differences which are at the root of Yugoslavia's dispute with the Soviet and satellite leaders. Khrushchev may, however, have opened the way for talks with Tito, and the Albanian and Bulgarian party leaders may have been admonished to assume a friendlier attitude toward the Yugoslavs.

Tito, for his part, is aware of the many obstacles still hindering a complete rapprochement with Moscow and realizes that the USSR is not likely to accept him back into the bloc as long as he insists on his terms. Khrushchev's intemperate remarks about Yugoslavia in Prague probably dampened any optimism regarding relations with Moscow which Tito may have felt as a result of Molotov's ouster.

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All the members of the new Soviet party secretariat attended, with the exception of Mikhail A. Suslov who has appeared publicly only once since the June shake-up. Also notable for his absence was presidium member Anastas I. Mikoyan who, like Suslov, had much to do in the past year with satellite affairs.

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
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### 3. UNFAVORABLE WEATHER HITS IMPORTANT SOVIET GRAIN REGIONS

Unfavorable weather conditions have prevailed in important grain regions of the USSR, according to a 13 July Pravda editorial. Soviet Russia on 12 July reported that there had been dry winds and no rainfall in the Saratov-Volga area this summer. A Western official returning from the new lands area on 13 July reported spotty prospects. The outlook is fair to good for Altai Krai, poor around Pavlodar, modest in the Akmolinsk area, and "a complete failure" near Kokchetav.

#### Comment

A poor harvest this year would be a damaging blow to Khrushchev's much-publicized program to "match" the United States in milk and butter production in 1958 since additional fodder supplies are essential for an increase in output of livestock products.



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5. TALKS WITH ALGERIANS LIKELY TO EMBARRASS  
FRENCH GOVERNMENT IN CONFIDENCE VOTE

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The French National Assembly on 19 July is scheduled to vote on a motion of confidence giving the government special powers to deal with Algerian terrorism


in France. The chances of the government are likely to be affected by press revelations that Yves Goeau-Brissonniere, a member of Foreign Minister Pineau's staff, conducted "secret" talks with Algerian nationalists in Tunis earlier this month. Right-center deputies whose support Premier Bourges-Maunoury needs have been particularly insistent that the government follow a strong policy to retain Algeria for France.

Goeau-Brissonniere has told American embassy officials in Paris that he was instructed to talk to the Algerian nationalists by Premier Bourges-Maunoury without the knowledge of key cabinet ministers including even Pineau. He plans to return to Tunis this week end to continue the talks.

In the meantime, he anticipates that his earlier talks will be given full press treatment since one paper has already published a story about his contacts. The "official" explanation for his trip will be that he was a delegate to a meeting of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions.

He believes that the new statute for Algeria being prepared by the government is of "zero" value. He said that the Algerian nationalists, while still insisting upon eventual independence, are willing to negotiate the manner of its coming.

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6. TUNISIAN PREMIER REPORTEDLY WILL ESTABLISH  
REPUBLIC SOON

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Tunisian Premier Bourghiba plans to  
oust the Bey and declare a republic on  
or about 1 August.

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Bourghiba intends to become president with Vice  
Premier Bahi Ladgham as premier.

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Comment

The dissolution of the monarchy has been  
the subject of considerable speculation  
within Tunisia since Bourghiba assumed control over the gov-  
ernment 16 months ago. Opposition by the Sultan of Morocco  
and the King of Libya to the dissolution of the Tunisian mon-  
archy reportedly has been partially responsible for Bourghiba's  
hesitancy to take such a step.

There is no indication that as president,  
Bourghiba would relinquish the firm control he has always ex-  
ercised over Tunisian affairs.

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**8. RETURN OF LEFTIST APRA PARTY LEADER MAY  
TOUCH OFF VIOLENCE IN PERU**

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The arrival on 20 July of Haya de la Torre, highly controversial founder of the leftist but non-Communist Peruvian APRA party, for the APRA congress opening in Lima on

26 July may touch off violence which might seriously threaten the stability of the Peruvian government. President Prado, who was elected in 1956 with APRA support and who restored the party to legal status, has apparently been under army pressure to check APRA's growing influence in labor and politics. Restive army officers have reportedly been plotting with conservative, Communist, and powerful Communist-infiltrated opposition groups since early 1957 to oust Prado because of his "alliance" with APRA.

The American embassy in Lima comments that Haya--exiled for several years--still arouses strong feeling among all Peruvians and that Communist and other anti-APRA elements may use the mass demonstrations of welcome planned for his arrival to provoke incidents to discredit Haya, APRA, and the government. The government is alert to this possibility and determined to prevent such action, but discontented army and conservative elements may view a flare-up as an opportunity to move for the restoration of an authoritarian regime.

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ANNEX

Watch Report 363, 18 July 1957  
of the  
Intelligence Advisory Committee

Conclusions on Indications of Hostilities

On the basis of findings by its Watch Committee, the Intelligence Advisory Committee concludes that:

- A. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against the continental US or its possessions in the immediate future.
- B. No Sino-Soviet bloc country intends to initiate hostilities against US forces abroad, US allies or areas peripheral to the orbit in the immediate future.
- C. Early deliberate initiation of hostilities by Israel or the Arab states is not probable. Although tensions continue between the Arab states and Israel and among certain Arab states themselves, these are not likely to lead to serious conflict in the immediate future.